Vucic Only Leader to Refuse Ukraine Declaration in Kyiv
The Serbian president visited Ukraine for the first time since the Russian invasion began, and left the fifth Southeast Europe, Ukraine summit as the only leader who did not sign the declaration.

- At the fifth Southeast Europe, Ukraine summit in Kyiv, Vucic was the only participant who did not sign the joint declaration.
- It was his first visit to Ukraine since the Russian invasion began, arriving from Paris via Moldova and central Ukraine.
- Serbia has not imposed sanctions on Russia and does not seek NATO membership, insisting on deciding for itself.
- Pristina was not invited for the second consecutive summit, as Ukraine has not recognised Kosovo.
Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic attended the fifth Southeast Europe, Ukraine summit in Kyiv on July 15, 2026, and left it as the only participant who declined to put his name to the joint declaration. It was his first trip to Ukraine since the Russian invasion began, and he reached the Ukrainian capital from Paris, travelling through Moldova and central Ukraine. In the declaration, the other signatories committed to continued political, military, financial and humanitarian support for Ukraine, to strengthening air defences, to reconstruction, energy security and speeding up Ukraine’s path towards the European Union.
Vucic himself was brief afterwards: he was the only one who did not sign, and once the text of the declaration is read, he added, the reason will be clear. That reason is the formula Belgrade has been repeating for years. Serbia has not introduced sanctions against Russia, does not want NATO membership, and insists that it makes its own decisions. Signing a document that commits its backers to military support for one side in a war would break that formula on paper, in front of the cameras, in Kyiv.
The summit was the fifth in the series, following Odesa, Athens, Dubrovnik and Tirana. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen attended, along with officials from Albania, Moldova, Romania, Croatia, Slovenia, North Macedonia, Bulgaria, Montenegro and Turkey, while Greece joined online. In that company Serbia was the only country that stayed away from the common text, and not quietly, but with a public explanation from the president himself.
Why did Vucic travel to Kyiv at all if he did not intend to sign?
Because showing up and signing are two different things, and that distinction is the whole point. Serbia confirmed that it supports Ukraine’s territorial integrity in line with the Charter of the United Nations, a statement that has never been mere diplomatic courtesy in Belgrade. The same Charter is the argument Serbia uses for its own territorial integrity, so recognising Ukrainian borders in Kyiv simultaneously works in Serbia’s favour.
The other side of that calculation is visible in the guest list. Pristina was not invited to the summit, for the second time in a row after Odesa, because Ukraine has not recognised Kosovo. That is a concrete, measurable outcome, and it is not achieved by staying away from such gatherings but by attending them. In Kyiv, Vucic also held bilateral talks, among them with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky.
What the missing signature actually means
This is not the first time Serbia has stayed outside a joint text, but it is the first time it has happened in Kyiv, at a gathering whose entire purpose is support for Ukraine. The message is therefore twofold, and deliberately so. Serbia arrives, sits at the table, talks about infrastructure, energy and the European path, but does not sign anything that would draw it into the military logic of the war.
In Brussels the abstention will be read as one more entry in the file on alignment with the Union’s foreign policy, a subject that has followed Serbia since the first day of accession talks and that resurfaces with every new cluster. In Moscow it will be read as confirmation that Belgrade has not crossed the line. The opposition in Serbia has argued for years that this balancing act is exhausted and that delay carries a price, while the governing side replies that the balancing act is precisely why Serbia still gets to choose for itself.
The corridors, by our understanding, are what will decide this, not the declaration. The text Serbia did not sign stands without its signature anyway, and what remains is the question of how long a country can be a guest in Kyiv and a state without sanctions on Moscow on the same day.
Is the missing signature in Kyiv a defence of Serbian neutrality, or a delay of a decision that will have to be made regardless?



