Montenegro Denies Joining Croatia-Albania-Pristina Pact

Montenegro’s Ministry of Defense has rejected claims by Belgrade media that Podgorica is negotiating to join the defense mechanism that Croatia, Albania and Pristina set up a little over a year ago. For Serbia this isn’t a remote issue: it is the first regional security format put together without Belgrade, and Montenegro is a neighbor where a significant share of citizens declare themselves ethnically Serbian, and where any decision on military alliances carries a domestic political price.

The denial was posted on the ministry’s Instagram account, tagged “Fake News.”

For the accurate information of the public and to prevent the spread of disinformation, we point out that Montenegro has not held talks on joining the aforementioned military alliance, nor does it plan to become part of it. All claims suggesting otherwise are not true.

The wording is blunter than the usual diplomatic caution. Podgorica did not say the matter was still undecided, or that talks were underway at a technical level. It said no talks had taken place at all. The trigger was reporting out of Belgrade that cited information from “Politika” claiming contacts existed and that Montenegro’s move toward the format would unfold as a process rather than a single step.

What was signed in Tirana, and what has changed since

Croatia, Albania and Pristina signed a joint declaration on defense and security cooperation in Tirana on March 18, 2025. The document calls for stronger military interoperability, joint training and exercises, cooperation between defense industries, information sharing and coordination against hybrid threats.

During 2026 that paper gained an operational follow up. In January, directors for defense policy and armaments met in Zagreb. In February, the chiefs of the general staffs of Albania and Croatia met in Shkoder along with the commander of the so called Kosovo Security Force, where preparations for concrete trilateral military exercises were agreed. Croatia’s defense ministry announced in April that Zagreb and Tirana wanted to continue that trilateral cooperation.

Despite all of this, no decision by Montenegro’s government, no invitation and no publicly released document on expanding the list of signatories has surfaced. The claim about contacts rests on unnamed sources, and the only official statement from either side is the one that came out of Podgorica.

Where Montenegro and Serbia already sit at the same table

What tends to get left out of this story is that Montenegro does not need any new format to be in the same room as Zagreb, Tirana and Pristina. It is already a member of the Adriatic Charter, A5, alongside the United States, Croatia, Albania, North Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, while Pristina takes part in that initiative as an observer. Serbia holds the same observer status in A5, which complicates any reading that every Adriatic defense platform is by definition aimed at Belgrade.

Croatia chairs A5 through 2026 and has named joint training, regional resilience and civil military cooperation as its priorities. In March, a representative of Montenegro’s Defense Ministry took part in a meeting of A5 political directors in Croatia. In April, representatives of the armed forces of Croatia, Albania and Montenegro, with observers from Pristina, met in Zagreb and at Udbina. In June, the same structures took part in the international cyber exercise “Combined Adriatic Cyber Endeavour 2026.” Albania’s then defense minister, Piro Vengu, said in December 2025 that he saw Pristina’s membership in A5 as a strategic necessity.

Why did the denial come so fast?

The answer lies in the makeup of Montenegro’s electorate, not in military hardware. A significant share of Montenegro’s citizens identify as Serbian, the Serbian Orthodox Church commands broad trust, and most people in the country regard Serbia as the closest state in the region rather than a threat. The government in Podgorica also relies in parliament on parties that entered on Serbian votes.

Openly aligning with a format that includes Pristina as a signatory would therefore become costly long before it turned into a military dispute. The denial is a message aimed in two directions at once, toward Belgrade and toward the domestic public, which marks a shift from Montenegro’s earlier reactions to Serbian media reporting, which were typically lukewarm or nonexistent.

The next moments when this issue is likely to resurface are already known. Montenegro’s government is preparing a new National Security Strategy meant to align with the changed regional circumstances, while Zagreb, Tirana and Pristina have agreed on their first joint exercises, whose date has not been announced. Until then, the only official word in circulation remains the one from Podgorica: no talks took place.