Brnabic: judicial laws will not be withdrawn

National Assembly Speaker Ana Brnabic said the package of judicial laws will not be withdrawn from parliamentary procedure, a statement that fixes the government’s position ahead of resumed debate on one of the most contested legislative packages of the year. Brnabic thereby rejected calls to send the proposals back to the drawing board, regardless of the recommendations that arrived from Venice less than two months ago.

The package amends five laws covering the judiciary and the public prosecution, proposed by ruling-majority MP Ugljesa Mrdic. The fact that it comes through an MP proposal rather than a government bill is itself part of the debate: critics argue this bypasses a wider public and expert process, while the sponsor insists it is a legitimate parliamentary route.

The Venice Commission, the Council of Europe’s advisory body on constitutional matters, issued an urgent opinion on April 24 with seven key recommendations. The Commission warned that some amendments undermine the autonomy of the prosecution and the independence of the judiciary, two points that have sat at the center of disputes over constitutional matters and the country’s European path for years.

Why is the government refusing to drop the disputed package?

Brnabic’s message that there will be no withdrawal carries a clear political logic. The government does not want to set a precedent in which a legislative proposal is pulled from procedure under pressure from an external body, as that would weaken its hand in any future dispute with Brussels over reform commitments. Instead of withdrawal, it signals work on the proposals through amendments and debate, leaving room to formally adopt part of the objections while keeping the package as a whole alive.

Legal experts, for their part, warn that the Venice Commission’s recommendations are not cosmetic matters. The autonomy of the prosecution and the independence of the judiciary are written into the 2022 constitutional amendments, so any statutory implementation that narrows them raises a question of compliance with the Constitution itself. Therein lies the government’s biggest risk: if the package passes in its disputed form, it could end up before the Constitutional Court.

What does the opposition want, and what does the government offer?

The opposition argues that the Venice Commission opinion does not solve the core problems and that partial adoption of the recommendations will not be enough. By that logic, the issue is not in individual articles but in the approach itself, since the package, they say, shifts the balance toward the executive. Their demand is clear: withdraw the proposals and open a new, broad debate with the participation of the profession and professional associations.

The government offers the opposite model. It keeps the proposals in procedure, promises that part of the objections will be incorporated, and insists that reform must not be halted. The debate thus moves to the terrain of amendments, where it will be measured how much of the seven recommendations from Venice are genuinely translated into the text, and how much remains at the level of announcement.

The open question concerns the substance of the reform itself: is it possible to align five judicial laws with the Venice Commission’s recommendations without withdrawing the package, or is every partial fix simply a postponement of the next dispute? Where do you think the line falls between legitimate reform and pressure on judicial independence?