Serbia Passes Judicial Reforms: One Term for Court Presidents

The National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia, at its seventh extraordinary session, adopted changes to a set of judicial laws that rework the rules for selecting holders of judicial office. The package covers the Law on Judges, the Law on Public Prosecution and the Law on the High Prosecutorial Council, all harmonized with recommendations from the Venice Commission. The vote took place as part of an agenda of 32 items confirmed by parliament on the same day.

The central change concerns the mandate of court presidents. Under the adopted provisions, a court president will now serve a single five-year term, with no possibility of being re-elected to head the same court. This abandons the previous practice of re-election, which legal experts had for years identified as a mechanism that weakened judicial independence and created relationships of dependence within the institutions themselves.

The amendments to the Law on Judges and the Law on the High Prosecutorial Council were supported by 140 deputies, while 139 voted for the changes to the Law on Public Prosecution. The legislative package is also publicly known as the so-called Mrdic laws, and it was adjusted during the procedure to reflect the comments and suggestions of the European advisory body on constitutional and legal matters.

What does a single term for court presidents actually change?

Capping the role at one five-year term alters the internal logic of how courts are run. A court president, who assigns cases, organizes the work and influences the career advancement of judges, could until now count on re-election. By removing that option, lawmakers aim to reduce the room for permanent centers of power within individual courts and to reinforce the principle that the office is temporary and limited.

Alignment with Venice Commission recommendations is more than a formality. This Council of Europe body assesses legal solutions through the lens of the rule of law and the separation of powers, and its recommendations are tracked by European Union progress reports on Serbia’s accession process. Changes to how judicial officials are chosen therefore carry both a domestic and an external dimension, touching on the daily work of courts and on how reforms coming from Brussels are evaluated.

Are the changes enough to strengthen judicial independence?

The ruling majority presents the amendments as a continuation of harmonizing domestic legislation with European standards and as a step toward clearer, more predictable rules in the judiciary. The emphasis is that the solutions went through a procedure in which the Venice Commission’s comments were taken into account, which the authorities read as confirmation that the reform is moving in the right direction.

Part of the opposition and some professional associations had earlier warned that individual changes, however much in line with the recommendations, do not change the substance without a broader consensus on judicial independence and on how judges and prosecutors are selected. Whether limiting the term of court presidents will truly shift the distribution of influence in the judiciary remains an open question, since much depends on implementation and on how the new rules mesh with existing institutions.

The set of judicial laws now enters the implementation phase, and the real reach of these solutions will be measured through the actual selection of court presidents in the coming years. Will a single term with no re-election bring a visible change in how courts work, or will it remain a legal norm without deeper effect?